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Abstract
This paper seeks to interpret political 
and institutional crisis from a perspective 
that prefers to interpret its internal 
dynamics, as a method to explicit the 
whole social process. It suggests that to 
interpret political crisis, it is necessary to 
make longer observation of  the moves 
and actions of  the main players and 
institutions in operation, in a context of  
social complexity. Thus, this paper aims 
to explicit the inability to focus on the 
outcomes of  a political crisis, without 
taking into account its internal processes, 
which vary according to the diffuse and 
specific political capital possessed by 
social and institutional players. Thereby, 
political crisis are moments of  fluidity 
of  the prior political equilibrium, which 
can be amended on new bases, with a 
new legitimacy brought by individual and 
institutional performance in specific social 
space and historical time.
Resumo
Este trabalho busca interpretar as situações 
de crise política a partir de uma perspectiva 
que compreende que as dinâmicas internas 
a esses processos institucionais são 
especialmente significativas e explicativas 
do todo. O artigo sugere que uma 
interpretação mais acurada das crises 
políticas é necessariamente devedora 
de uma observação mais demorada das 
jogadas, ações e movimentações dos 
principais atores sociais e das instituições, 
em um contexto de complexidade social. 
Busca-se explicitar a insuficiência do foco 
no princípio e nos resultados das crises 
políticas, sem levar em consideração os 
processos internos, que variam de acordo 
com os capitais difuso e específico detidos 
pelos principais atores individuais e 
institucionais. Desse modo, as crises podem 
ser vistas como momentos de fluidez do 
equilíbrio político, que se refaz em novas 
bases, sustentadas na aquisição de uma 
nova legitimidade a partir do desempenho 
e das jogadas dos agentes em operação 
naquele espaço e tempo específicos. 
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INTRODUCTION
The subject of  this paper has been selected because it deals with one 
of  the most important questions in political sociology. Social and institutional 
crises are generally periods of  upheaval and fast change of  morals, behavior 
and of  the institutions themselves, therefore with enormous political potential. 
However, crises have their own logic of  operation and their outcomes are all 
the more dubious. The challenges posed to social scientists are proportional to 
this uncertainty.
We will discuss more often about two major schools with their different 
approaches and methodologies. The first one brings out the possibility of  
forecasting crisis situations from studying economic statistics and the living 
standards of  a given society. The second one has a different view that social 
and political crisis surge in agreement with a historical and institutional linearity 
which causes - for its reproduction as for its renewal – critical situations 
generating a social force larger than the one of  its inertia. However, the main 
idea of  this paper is that crisis situations are normal components of  the political 
life of  our societies.
Understanding mobilizations as natural is necessary to explain a certain 
number of  specific situations. For example, the military coup d’état of  March 
1964 in Brazil, occurred mainly due to President João Goulart’s political agenda 
who intended, during a certain period of  time, to gain support to his government 
from the popular forces, (DRAKE, 1966) by making concessions to them. The 
coup d’état annulled this agenda, replacing its main points with others. The 
rising popular mobilization, mainly in the poor Northeast, was suffocated and 
its development halted. Today, after a redemocratization phase, it is verified that 
some points of  this agenda tend to reappear on the Brazilian political scene. 
Therefore, social movements such as those of  the landless workers, MST, acquired 
an important political force and placed, once more, in the national public scene 
the issue of  agrarian reform, in an extremely unequal country from an economic 
and social point of  view. The dysfuntionallity in these decisions are evident, but 
only from the point of  view of  the most affluent economic classes, not in the 
action to counter social reforms in itself. And apparently, this kind of  specific 
situation will exist as long as the inequality belongs and that the gap between 
classes is not supported by a strong institutional force (such as the military).
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In this paper, I will initially try to show mobilizations as a continuity 
process and a political movement with an important tactical presence, even if  it is 
an unconventional political process. Furthermore, we will try to explain why we 
cannot understand political resources as something that can be transferred from 
a political group or institution to another one. This shows that social and political 
mobilizations have their own logic. And, that an economic methodological 
system is not the best framework to analyze social crisis situations.
After that, I will propose the perspective that, what makes the specific 
character of  our modern societies is their chaotic way of  organization. What 
follows from this argumentation is important to the extent that we cannot talk 
about a pure institutional logic. Next, we will talk about another important 
characteristic of  social and political crisis – the process of  loss of  legitimacy of  
political leaders, public institutions and social organizations. To a large extent, 
the process of  loss of  legitimacy retains responsibility for the birth of  political 
crisis situations. We can refer to some sort of  breaking an implicit contract 
between the politicians and the other participating members of  the political 
system. Finally, paradoxically, I will propose that one possible settling for a social 
crisis circumstance continues to be the institutional one. What denotes that there 
may be a transfer of  the crisis to a legitimate and conventional political sphere. 
However, even here, it’s difficult to predict the final outcome.
1 THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL MOBILIZATION
To start this section, we will underline the perspective pointed out by the 
French author Michel Dobry. In his book (DOBRY, 1992), he argues that we 
have to restore the internal dynamics of  the social and political mobilizations 
which affect simultaneously several societal spheres to better understand 
political crises phenomena. To do so, he makes some personal choices about 
the perspective he adopts.
The first of  such choices is the one of  continuity. It means that the springs 
of  political crises are not the effect, as it might be described by neo-positivists and 
“organic” sociology theories, of  individuals or collective pathological operations. 
Dobry will point out to the importance of  returning to social and political crisis 
situations its normality status.
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This hypothesis also corresponds to a displacement of  the theoretical 
interest towards events in the processes of  political crisis itself  to the detriment 
of  the political result from its development. Michel Dobry remarks that in 
general “analysts of  Revolutions love origins and outcomes, but often neglect 
organization and dynamics and even sometimes agency” (McADAM; TARROW; 
TILLY, 1997, p. 143). In methodical terms, such argument makes reference to 
the fact that one cannot make an analysis of  political crisis starting from their 
results. These results do not represent what occurs inside societal movements, 
and do not restore the logic or the tactics of  the players and their leaders and 
representatives. This is an approach that adopts, to some extent, a Clausewitz’s 
tactical point of  view, but without the perspective of  continuity as “means-ends”.
Mainstream Political Science in the 1960s in the field of  political crisis 
would consider that the idea of  mobilization has only a few connections with 
the social player’s tactical activity. Even if  “the starting point for the study of  
contentious politics were the Western social movement cycle of  the sixties” 
(McADAM; TARROW; TILLY, 1997)1. Thus, the concept of  mobilization makes 
sense only as a modernization or a “general process of  change” (DEUTSCH, 
1961)2 of  a traditional society towards a modern way of  life. For Dobry, the 
central characteristic of  these empirical data is that fact that it alienated from 
the mobilization and tactics operated by the main social players questioning 
institutional public processes.
It was Amitai Etzioni who first cut off  the umbilical relation between 
mobilization and modernization of  current societies (CHAZEL, 1975). He 
gave a new definition for mobilization, simply saying that this phenomenon is a 
process by which a social unit acquires important control of  assets (ETZIONI, 
1968 apud CHAZEL, 1975), which does not necessarily mean modernization of  
a society. Thus, we can make reference to social mobilizations aiming to paralyze 
a modernization process. Or, it can be counter-revolutionary and distant from an 
1 We will also find in this article a description (p. 145-151) of  the three methodological 
approaches that was adopted by researchers in the sixties: the structural one – with a marked 
difference between the American scholars “like Charles Tilly (1975) and Sidney Tarrow (1983, 
1989)” that “saw collective action gravitating around the political struggle”. Followed by 
Western Europeans authors, with a different kind of  structuralism, a post-Marxist one (p. 145) 
– adopting a rationalist approach – based particularly on the “version of  the collective action 
theory brought by the American economist Mancur Olson” (p. 147) – and the cultural one – 
primarily from Marxist perspective, in the work of  authors like Gramsci, Foucault, Derrida (p. 
149) and Lukács.
2 This author considers social mobilizations as specific political effects such as: topic pressures 
to increase governmental capacities; strengthened political participation; or transformation of  
the flow of  political communication.
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intention for modernization. Apparently, Etzioni aims to concentrate his analysis 
on the player’s action. However, he still understands mobilization as social 
change. Nonetheless, for him, it is necessary to concede that it is true that those 
two variables- modernization and mobilization come together rather frequently. 
Another point to be emphasized is the definition of  the notion of  
“mobilization”. In practical terms, it can be understood as a “move” in a social 
conflict context (DOBRY, 1992, p. 21). From this perspective, it also implies 
that social mobilization could be interpreted as a concrete action in the political 
sphere. Based on this viewpoint of  mobilization as a political advance, we can 
conceive it as the individual or collective behavior that will have the propriety 
to affect the expectations of  the protagonists of  a given conflict about the 
performance of  the other players (GOFFMAN, 1968)3. Therefore, using the 
social media to coordinate demonstrations, to erect barricades in Cartier Latin, 
to occupy public buildings, to dissolve the government (in a Parliamentary 
regime), to announce a candidacy prior to elections constitute political “moves” 
(DOBRY, 1983). Reminding that, these activities may only have a symbolic 
value. For example, the countrywide internet blackout implemented by the 
Egyptian government days before the fall of  Mubarak was perfectly seen by 
the movement protagonists as a menace, and it had probably changed their own 
political calculations. It also sparked the use of  Facebook pages (CASTELLS, 
2015; WEYLAND, 2012; NOGUEIRA; CASTRO, 2014). Or, decades ago, the 
meeting between President De Gaulle and military officers in Baden-Baden in 
May 1968 was understood as the effective use of  French troops in the conflict 
fomented by the student movement. 
2 POLITICAL MOBILIZATIONS: TWO CONFLICTING 
PERSPECTIVES
By arguing that mobilizations are instrumental, it may be inferred that 
(moves) in social crisis situations have an evident and tangible objective. The 
resources being mobilized are regarded as complex and elementary means to 
be used by political players concerning the achievement of  specific ends. The 
effect of  this instrumental vision consists in considering mobilized resources 
as entities isolated from the social context in which they exist and operate, as if  
3 To better understand the relationship between social players and their environment, see the 
concept of  “existential situation”. For example, in Goffman (1968). 
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they were “independent things”. The characteristics of  the mobilized resources 
are implicit to the instrumental point of  view as something independent from 
social relations.
Some political scientists even say that there’s an “intrinsic nature” of  the 
mobilized resources. It is true that weapons and currency have a stable physical 
propriety. Therefore, the instrumental perspective understands that political 
resources could be exchanged, operating like economic goods and markets. Political 
resources would be an attributed value, resulting from a supply and demand scheme.
However, one cannot say the same when referring to legitimacy and 
charisma. Accordingly, an argument against an instrumental vision of  mobilization 
is based on the fact that political resources have stable proprieties in very specific 
social logic (DOBRY, 1992). Thus, these resources cannot be transferred from a 
social group to another, and neither can produce the same effect in two diverse 
situations. Thereby, the electoral success of  a party is not easily transmitted to 
another one. Or, the percentage of  the votes obtained in a Municipal election 
does not necessarily end up in the same result for the Legislative houses. It is 
challenging, for example, for the British Communist Party to convert in votes 
and in political mobilization its influence in the Labor Unions. Therefore, this 
instrumental vision leads to an erroneous design in economic terms, distant from 
what really confers the “value” of  mobilized resources. In regards to the social 
relations, there is no parallel to currency for market exchanges.
In this perspective, social and political crises are mobilizations and 
moments of  transformation in the social system leading to a critical state.
3 TRANSFORMATION OF THE POLITICAL SPHERE
Therefore, neither the value, nor the effectiveness of  political resources 
transfer their properties nor the social players’ calculations can be apprehended 
independently to the complex network within mobilizations are contextualized. 
In this regard, and in reference to political crises, the point of  view of  Michel 
Dobry is correct when he stresses the opposition between routine situations and 
critical ones. Thus, the perspective raised here is based on the assumption that 
political crises are social mobilizations, that leads to transformation of  prior state 
– a passage of  social systems.
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Nevertheless, this complex process needs to be considered carefully. In 
this aspect, the structural characteristics of  multi-sector mobilizations involve 
shared internal processes among representatives of  internal processes and with 
those which relate to the external aspects of  such movements. Namely, internal 
aspects correspond to specific social logic and its external face to the autonomy 
that a given sector has concerning the myriad of  other ones (DOBRY, 1992).
In this regard, a long-lasting theoretical tradition has already identified, 
and described a “specific institutional logic” forged from standard ideals. For 
example, the market logic, the internal operation of  rational bureaucracies, the 
Military system (as disciplinary organizations) and the schooling tradition. Classic 
authors like Max Weber (WEBER, 2003) and Erving Goffman (GOFFMAN, 
1968) refer to ideal types – relating to specific character of  each sector – the 
combat for militarized sectors, the teaching activity for the school systems, 
competition and focus on profit by the market, among others. Nonetheless, that 
viewpoint logic is not in line with the occurrences of  society daily life. Logic 
shaping and transforming historicity is somewhat more chaotic.
Thus, it is not surprising that great political crisis, such as the one in Brazil 
in June 2013, or French one in 1968, corresponds necessarily to multi-sector 
mobilizations, located simultaneously in several different spheres, autonomous 
from each other. This is what constitutes the main structural (BOURDIEU, 1980) 
factor for the comprehension of  social crisis. From here comes the observation 
of  increased mobility, where chaotic social aspects lead to a high level of  fluidity 
of  the political sphere. 
4 CRISIS ROOTS AND THE LOSS OF LEGITIMACY
All crises are in a certain way a legitimacy crisis. They relate to loss of  assets 
occurring in contexts of  political fluidity. Accordingly, as an asset, legitimacy can 
be obtained by the accumulation of  a high level of  diffuse support (EASTON, 
1979; CASTRO, 2017). Namely, goodwill on behalf  of  members of  a political 
system. either by calling upon symbols of  common interest, or by strengthening 
the degree of  recognition of  members of  a given political community.
Thus, a process of  political legitimacy loss is seen as the reduction of  
diffuse social support, a process that can take place in various ways. First, the 
expectation of  members of  a national political system cannot be met over a long 
period of  time.
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Second, the loss of  legitimacy can be seen in the resurgence of  a gap 
between the values inculcated to the individuals during their socialization, and 
the overall operation of  the political system, the representation of  official 
institutions, or the behavior and the perspectives expressed by authorities.
Loss of  legitimacy of  political systems is a phenomenon which operates 
in the long term. Thus, a diffuse support stands longer than a specific - seen 
as tactical one Therefore, loss of  legitimacy constitutes a critical aspect in the 
formation of  a political crisis, and the level of  diffuse support plays the most 
important part. However, a reservoir of  diffuse support permits an extension of  
time for a given political regime.
5 FINDING WAYS OUT: THE INSTITUTIONAL HYPOTHESIS
Although paradoxical, a potential solution for political crisis passes 
through institutionalized channels. That means that political confrontations tend 
to be channeled towards certain institutional sectors of  the legitimate political 
spectrum. As shown in 2011 with 15-M (acronym for May), the Spanish anti-
austerity movement that in the beginning 2014 led to the creation of  “Podemos”, 
a new political party to run the national elections (RAMIRO; GOMEZ, 2016). 
Or, as stated by Michel Dobry, that was the case in France in 1968 with the 
dissolution of  the National Assembly. In both situations, the implementation 
or the activation of  standard regulation was visibly followed by a normalization 
of  the political confrontation, even if  followed by less intense waves of  political 
demonstrations.
Thereby, it may be necessary to consider the bargaining which is carried 
out between the various players, and finally the negotiated character of  the events, 
as it was the case in the examples previously quoted. And that corresponds to 
a de facto anticipation, for it coincides with the emergence of  a new political 
formation in Spain, or as in France with Parliament dissolution and the transfer 
of  power to the opposition party. Accordingly, those calculations guarantee that 
the diverse social players present in the political scene do not lose too many 
assets. This is definitely a political approach which legitimates (and self-regulates) 
faster shifts towards a specific political direction.
Consequently, political action gets lower possibilities to attain scale. 
However, this is a consistent characteristic of  negotiations between legitimate 
players in the political sphere, as shown by scholars on crisis processes in 
democratic systems (STREEK, 2011; VALENZUELA, 1978).
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A third strategy to overcome a political crisis is through a player with 
charismatic traits (WEBER, 2003). This happens when an individual, who has a 
kind of  “certificate of  personal qualifications” in the public opinion, offers an 
outcome, a conclusion where he can intervene (CHAMPAGNE, 1990; CASTRO, 
2019). Therefore, players with these characteristics can influence the political 
world and provoke various confronting segments to take a position. However, 
these charismatic strategies constitute a distinct kind of  outcome emerging from 
confrontations, which may lead to success or failure in attaining power. 
CONCLUSION
Finally, we will call fluid political periods, the specific class of  critical 
situations which correspond to transformations in a state of  a complex system, 
when they are followed by multi-sector mobilizations. Such fluid situations are 
specific to a social dynamic and a tactical game that are structurally original. 
That is, one which cannot be reduced to the binary logic of  common sense: 
the opposition to the status quo and political stability on one hand, and social 
disintegration and rule of  violence on the other hand.
It’s worth repeating that a methodological simplification can compromise 
a broader view of  the natural complexity of  social processes. A comprehensive 
perspective, far from constituting an obstacle to the intelligibility of  these 
processes, represents one of  their essential conditions. 
Further comments can be made. Initially, it is when an official sector is 
experiencing a transition in power that a social player can understand its strategic 
role. Therefore, we conclude that an individual is neither more nor less rational 
in political contexts of  fluidity or in stability. In addition, from the Marxist theory 
of  social conflict, there is, in different ways, the survival of  social forms from 
the past which appears in the heart of  social upheavals (DUPRAT, 1973). And 
these “roles” coming from the past are different variables with a potential to 
influence the outcomes of  a situation of  political fluidity (SOUZA; JODKHA; 
REHBEIN, 2017). 
The main debate in this paper was to show that one has to understand 
the political actions of  participants in such processes as rooted in a very clear 
and logic rationality: their own political group rationality, based on the stock of  
knowledge they possess in a given time
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If  one agrees that a political resource is not a form of  social capital which 
can be automatically transferred to specifics actors, then, institutions cannot 
be understood as perfectly logical, but as structures enclosing different levels 
of  uncertainty. In addition, it is necessary to understand that political crises are 
sometimes the result of  processes of  deterioration in a given state of  a specific 
social system. In this sense, an analysis should stop trying to find the origins of  
a crisis, aiming at unveiling causality, and categorizing those crises in categories 
developed ex ante. Furthermore, an analysis should not look solely into the 
outcomes of  crises. As stated above, the internal complexity of  a political process 
is more significant for analytical purposes. This is because, with this perspective, 
one can clarify the social, political and institutional moves with the necessary 
material for social scientists to deliver to the main players in the political scenario. 
It is also the kind of  material that is more valuable to be returned to society as a 
whole, with its interpretation on the stated historical phenomena.
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